Dheeraj Paramesha Chaya’s “The Fundamental Principles of Covert Military Action: Lessons from India’s 1971 Experience” offers a significant contribution to the understanding of covert operations, a domain often shrouded in secrecy. By delving into India’s pivotal role in the liberation of Bangladesh, Chaya provides an unique lens through which to examaine the intricacies of such actions.
The book’s core strength lies in its meticulous reconstruction of India’s covert operations in East Pakistan. Chaya effectively navigates the complex interplay of intelligence gathering, covert support, and diplomatic manoeuvrings, providing a comprehensive overview of the strategies employed. The author’s ability to weave together declassified documents, primary sources, and secondary analyses results in a compelling narrative that is both informative and engaging.
First phase outlines the initial stages of India’s involvement in the events leading to the liberation of Bangladesh. It primarily focuses on the period before March 1971, when India’s engagement with East Pakistan was largely limited to intelligence gathering.
India’s focus on East Pakistan intensified in the 1960s due to Pakistan’s support for Indian insurgents. Indian intelligence agencies cultivated ties with Bengali nationalists, but without a clear government policy, these connections were primarily for intelligence gathering. This changed dramatically in early 1971 with the political upheaval in East Pakistan. Factors such as shared animosity towards Pakistan, potential economic gains, and the hope for a secular East Pakistan influenced India’s stance. However, concerns about communist domination and a potential united Bengal tempered India’s enthusiasm.
A turning point came with an Indian-orchestrated flight hijacking, exposing Pakistan’s support for terrorism and altering India’s view of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Subsequently, a committee was formed to assess the implications of recognizing an independent Bangladesh and providing aid. As the crisis escalated, India recognized the potential for a prolonged guerrilla conflict and the need for more active involvement.
Second phase outlines India’s initial covert operations during the Bangladesh Liberation War. India formed the Mukti Fauj and established a Bangladesh government in exile but initially avoided formal recognition due to limited territorial control and the risk of raising false hopes.
Guerrilla warfare and psychological operations were combined as part of the strategy to draw attention to Pakistani atrocities, get sympathy from other countries, and render the conflict unsustainable for Pakistan. Propaganda campaigns were successful, but guerilla operations encountered several difficulties, such as a misalignment of Indian and Bengali objectives, variations in methods, and internal strife among the Bengali leadership.
India continued its clandestine support in spite of these obstacles with the goal of steadily weakening the Pakistan military. The text’s conclusion, however, notes that meaningful advancements in the freedom fight did not materialize until August 1971, coinciding with a change in India’s goals and an international environment.
Third Phase outlines the strategic and covert actions carried out by India prior to its military incursion into East Pakistan (current day Bangladesh) in 1971. While initially concentrating on providing covert support to the Mukti Bahini. India had to deal with obstacles including conflict between Bengali factions and foreign diplomacy. Under the direction of individuals such as D.P. Dhar and with support from organizations like R&AW (Research and Analysis Wing), India designed a complex strategy that included military instruction, disinformation campaigns, and clandestine weaponry acquisition. In December, after tensions had reached a breaking point, India took overt military action with the goal of securing Bangladesh’s independence in the face of international scrutiny and complex regional geopolitics including the US, China, and Pakistan.
Moving forward Chaya outline eight fundamental rules and principles of covert action. A culture of covert action, Institutions of covert action, Appropriate channels of advice, Objective assessment to guide action, Clear political assessment of the partners, Operational control of the rebels, Propaganda operations to supplement paramilitary operations, Critical appreciation of the role of secrecy. Chaya points these principles as the pillars of any successful covert operation.
The article provides an overview of India’s role in Bangladesh liberation with concentration on covert operations. While providing core understanding, it is open to certain critiques. While the article explains detailed political landscape of Bangladesh the article underplays political and domestic landscape that od India and Pakistan, such as the refugee crisis in India and the dire consequences of the same on domestic unrest especially that of West Bengal. Chaya also underplays the ethnic differences between West Pakistan and East Pakistan which indeed was one of the crucial reasons for the liberation cry. Although the article brings in comparison of Tamil crisis and India’s covert operation in Sri Lanka, more comparisons with other covert operations would have shed light on different situations concerning covert operations. Despite these critiques, the article does give an in-depth insight of the covert operation encouraging critical thinking of the same.
Chaya’s provides insights for modern military and strategic practitioners, demonstrating the continued significance of India’s covert operations in 1971. Chaya not only clarifies historical events but also offers a framework for comprehending the nuances and difficulties involved in covert military action by analysing the difficulties and triumphs of India’s covert operations. His work has made a substantial addition to our understanding of covert operations and their strategic consequences as well as the operational dynamics of contemporary combat scenarios.
Author – Ms. Radhika Shaw
radhika@kawachonline.me
